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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z.' f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

L' antinomie du transfini. ÉMILE BOREL. Rev. Ph., XXV, 4, pp. 378–383.

This essay enlarges upon the main theme of a former article on the mathematical problem of the "trans-finite," or "new infinite." But it considers the matter rather from a psychological point of view, and announces its conclusion as follows: "To acquire the notion of the indefinite, as it is employed in mathematics, something must be added to the remark that 'after each integer another follows.' One may see whence the difficulty in the antinomy of the trans-finite arises; it is a question of coming to understand clearly *from what point of view* the successive applications which are made of the fundamental theorem (that, *being given any numerable whole whatever of increasing functions, there exists one increasing function greater than any of them*), can be regarded as *the same* operation. For instance, in the study of space there is no difficulty, so long as one keeps to a purely geometrical point of view. The points of a straight line are all identical, for they have the same general properties. The difficulties come up with the arithmetical definitions, since here the comprehension of these common general properties is least easy."

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Art as a Means of Expression. W. J. STILLMAN. International Monthly, I, 133–161.

Art is best described as the harmonic expression of emotion; it is also the expression, through the emotions, of the character of the artist. The copyist, whether of nature or of other men, is no artist; the representation of natural objects is not art, but science. Science is common to all men; it is in their emotional nature that men differ, and hence art is the index of human character. Emotion naturally expresses itself in rhythm and harmony, as we see in music and the dance; and this rhythm or harmonic element in a work of art is the distinctly artistic one. But other elements enter into and enhance the work of the artist, the chief of which are the sense of beauty and imagination. Literal reproduction of any aspect of nature is scientific representation, which is the antithesis of art, and the prevalence of the scientific temper at the present day is injurious to art. It is probably as useless to attempt to revive art in our day as to construct a new religion. Art and religion are closely connected, not, however, because art depends on religion, but because they both spring from the same source, the emotional nature of man. Until a revolution has taken place in the nature of the human mind, no nexus between science and either art or religion can be established, nor can the antagonism between the scientific and the artistic and religious be abolished. Leonardo da Vinci is one of the most important witnesses to the difference between the two tendencies. His mind was scientific, not artistic, and his paintings are merely realistic representations of nature. The attempt to revive art in our day on the naturalistic dogma has proved a complete failure. The social and intellectual conditions which would favor the genesis of a new art cannot be defined nor created; but the prime condition is the revival of spiritual life.

J. B. PETERSON.

L'infini nouveau. EVELLIN ET Z. Rev. Ph., XXV, 2, pp. 132–143.

The author objects to the terms *indefinitely* and *transfinitely* as used by M. Cantor. The article is a detailed exposition of this objection. When we say, in speaking of a series of integers, that we have prolonged it *indefinitely*, the sense is obscure; it is referring to the result obtained by an operation that is not definite. Rationally, it is impossible to conceive of a series of integers as finished. For M. Cantor the series of integers is the result and therefore the theatre of a struggle or an agreement between two contrary principles; the principle of formation, and the principle of arrest. This first dogma of the new science can not be efficient, because, according as one employs the principle of formation or that of arrest, one can demonstrate either a proposition or its antithesis.

MARGARET E. SCHALLENBERGER.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

Die Theorie der ästhetischen Anschauung und die Association. PAUL STERN, Z. f. Ph., CXV, 2, pp. 193–203.

Nachtrag. JOHANNES VOLKELT, Z. f. Ph., CXV, 2, pp. 204–208.

In his article Stern objects to Volkelt's procedure in analyzing the æsthetic judgment. He maintains against Volkelt, that the unity of the æsthetic judgment is not due to a fusing of various elements by a function of consciousness *after* these elements appear. They appear at the very first as united, not as sundered. We must not speak of æsthetic perception as if we had a merely cognitive or logical judgment, and then blended a feeling with it. The perception, if it be æsthetic, is from the beginning that of concrete human experience, both cognitive and feeling. Consequently, we should refrain from saying that the object, as cognitively perceived, is enlivened (*beseelt*) by the action of feeling upon it; though we may admit, with circumspection and a warning not to carry the admission too far, that the observed æsthetic object must so act on the observer that there seems to him to be a feeling ruling in it.

In his reply Volkelt says that Stern and himself represent diametrically opposite ways of thinking. Stern proceeds from the unity of a state of consciousness to the different phases in it; while Volkelt proceeds from the separate elements to the unity. There is a manifold of elemental states of consciousness. These stand in an inner connection with one another,—a connection which we may call a fusion (*Verschmelzung*). In æsthetic perception we distinguish the sense or cognitive element, and the feeling element. We may say that the feeling content penetrates or builds itself into the cognitive content. These two aspects or elements of thought may be more or less independent and separate and still subsist: hence the propriety of considering their unity as a fusion. But their distinctness consists not in one existing and then the other; nor does their union consist in one imposing itself upon the other. Their distinctness lies in the fact that they are qualitatively different expressions of consciousness; their union in that these different expressions inhere in one concrete act of knowing. We may understand the fusion process as a special peculiarity or function of consciousness.

R. V. NYE.

A New Explanation of Weber's Law. LEON M. SOLOMONS. Psych. Rev., VII, 3, pp. 234–240.

The theory here presented is the outgrowth of some experiments upon the perception of sudden pressure changes. The author says: "If to a pressure, s, we suddenly add an increment, ds, without removing the original pressure, the change is perceived, not by a comparison of the old pressure, s, with the new pressure, $s + ds$; but directly as such." Weber's law is deduced from the known fact of the variability of brain process with constant stimulus. The threshold simply measures the range of this variability. *Two stimuli must differ by more than the range of this variability for their difference to be perceived.* The threshold ratio measures, not the delicacy of a sense, but its constancy; it is the variation ratio of the irritability. The threshold varies as the product of the stimulus and the percentage variability of the irritability. Weber's law should hold, therefore, as long as the variations of the irritability remain the same. It is claimed that this theory treats the whole of threshold phenomena together, and finds the explanation of Weber's law in the facts which account for the existence of the threshold. *But once grant this variability, and nothing more is necessary;* all the phenomena connected with thresholds follow easily from this. Both the reigning theories offer simply an *interpretation* of Weber's law, which does not connect it with other threshold phenomena, nor with any other well known psychological or physiological phenomena.

MARGARET E. SCHALLENBERGER.

On the Relation of Stimulus to Sensation in Visual Impressions. C. LLOYD MORGAN. Psych. Rev., VII, 3, pp. 217–233.

The author states the object of this investigation briefly as follows: "First, to produce what appears to the eye to be a smooth and even gradation from white into black through deepening shades of gray; secondly, to determine the proportionate amounts of stimulus or physical excitation, and to express them in a curve by means of the graphic method; and finally to ascertain the principles on which the amounts of stimulus and of sensation are related to each other." The method used for preparation of the discs was based on that employed by Kirschmann. The method for preparing the best sort of disc is described in detail. Both black and white and black and colored discs were used. The results from the phenomena under consideration are that "the Weber-Fechner formula cannot be accepted as it stands in the text-books." The law which is indicated by the observations is, "that *equal increments* of sensation are produced by *increments of stimulus in geometrical progression.*" The formula is not applicable to the curves throughout their whole extent.

F. M. WINGER.

L'ennui: étude psychologique. DR. ÉMILE TARDIEU. Rev. Ph., XXV, 1, 2, and 3, pp. 1–30, 144–175, and 237–255.

The author gives a detailed account of the causes and effects of *ennui* of different kinds, together with the names of some of the principal writers on the subject, and the celebrated cases they have described. There are six causes of *ennui*. Physical or mental weakness takes the first rank; it may be either acute and superficial, or chronic and profound. This weakness may appear early, or as a result of age, and brings with it states more or less conscious of *ennui*. The second cause of *ennui* is lack of variety and of power in one's capacities. This type includes the imbecile; the mediocre, the class which reserves its energy so as to live long; the feeble, who are strong in spirit but weak in flesh; those poorly equilibrated, superior in conception but weak in execution; the torpid dreamer; the melancholiac. The third kind of *ennui* is caused by any inferiority, or by any lack of life, and develops slowly and unconsciously. The fourth kind in the monotony of inaction or repetition, the stage of *ennui* which is most physiological, and to which everyone is subject. Fifth, the *ennui* of satiety overtakes those who have a surplus of wealth, for whom every desire is satisfied, and for whom there is 'nothing new under the sun.' It is an exaggerated repletion which leads to distaste. In this turning away from work effort is avoided, neither society nor the self is benefited, and arrest of development follows. It is need or desire which makes objects valuable. There is a simple and heroic remedy for *ennui* of this sort—complete change of mode of life and rebuilding of character. The sixth sort of *ennui* is that which arises through a feeling of the emptiness of life. It includes the ideas of the impossibility of happiness, the vanity of all kinds of effort, the knowledge of egoism, a realization of universal imbecility, in other words, pessimism. It may be due to privation, organic weakness, or to speculation which leads to the conclusion that nothing is worth while. If *ennui* is the result of an intellectual operation, intelligence will have some power over it, will attack it by irony and become its master by stoicism.

F. M. WINGER.

ETHICAL.

Fragen der Geschichtswissenschaft: II. Unrecht und Recht der "organischen" Gesellschaftstheorie. PAUL BARTH. V. f. w. Ph., XXIV, 1, pp. 69–97.

In a previous article the author has shown that the possibility of establishing causal connections among events is, necessarily, much more slight in the case of an individual life than in the case of a society or a determinate part of society. A true theory of society, therefore, must confirm this conclusion. A theory which conforms to this demand is offered in the conception of society as an organism. Since this conception is often attacked, it is necessary to determine in how far the form in which it is ordinarily held, is of valid application. First of all, our notion of 'organism' must be made definite. The distinction between organism and mechanism was first clearly drawn by Kant, who correctly ascribes to the organism the following differentiating characteristics: (1) The parts depend with respect to their existence and form upon their relation to the whole; (2) the parts mutually produce each other, both as regards their forms and their relations; (3) the whole produces other beings which share in its essential nature. Kant's conception of the organism still prevails in biology. On the basis of this definition society must also be regarded as an organism. For it is a unity which seeks to maintain itself against disintegrating forces, and which conditions the development of its members. Apart from society, man becomes a mere animal. The masterpieces of art always mark a high state of social development. Again, the members of society mutually condition each other. Finally, society reproduces itself, in space by colonization, etc., in time by inculcating its essential principles in the minds of the rising generations. However, a fundamental difference must be recognized between the physical organism and the social organism. The constituent element of the former is the cell, which is physical, or at most psycho-physical. The constituent element of the latter is the individual, regarded as a being endowed with volition. Because the individual is a member of society with regard to his will, and not with regard to his body, he may belong to several forms of society at the same time. The term 'society' usually denotes those permanent unions of individuals which directly or indirectly spring from blood relationship. Besides this form of society, however, there are societies which exist for the sake of religion, learning, etc. It is impossible to set a limit to the number of distinct forms of society that may arise in the future. Perhaps the best term that can be applied to this union of wills which we call society, is that of spiritual organism. Previous exponents of the view that society is an organism, have failed to recognize the spiritual nature pertaining to this organism, and have only attempted to trace, as far as possible, its identity with the physical organism. In spite of this necessary distinction, however, the conception of society as an organism is not a mere metaphor. In the attempt to causally relate historical conditions it is of supreme importance. If society is simply an aggregate, its changes are quite beyond the reach of explanation. BOYD BODE.

Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development. W. CALDWELL. Am. J. of Soc., V, 2, pp. 182–192.

In this article the author considers some of the important facts brought out in Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations of Mental Development*, together with Professor Dewey's criticism of this work. The book attempts to show that the "principles of the development of the individual apply also to the evolution of society." The two chief results, which make the book one of the most important in the field of philosophy and psychology that have appeared in this decade, are that the self must be conceived as a *socius*, as a bipolar unity, as one term or end of a personal relation arising out of a common or identical thought-content or action-content, and that society is a psychological organization. The same psychological principles of imitation and generalization, of habit and accommodation, are present in both the social organization and in the personal mental organization. Professor Baldwin has successfully used the genetic method. He has not assumed self and society, but the fact of mental development, and shown that apart from the genetic method it is impossible to understand the nature of consciousness and of conscious processes. There is nothing stable about the self but the process of its growth in a social environment, and its imperative duty of affecting that environment. The uniqueness of his work consists in his exhibiting to us by the genetic method the workings of the social self. The importance of the work to positive psychology is in the fulness of detail with which he works out the relations of thought-process to action-process. He shows how great a part imitation plays both in the life of the individual and in that of society. We assimilate thoughts of individuals by first assimilating their actions. Thought is the chief matter of social organization, and, hence, society may be treated as a psychological organization. Personality is also treated from the genetic standpoint; it has no reality unless there is progress, and not alone progress of the individual, but progress of society as a whole.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

L'enseignement scientifique de la morale. A. BERTRAND. Rev. Ph., XXV, 1, pp. 31–52.

Fichte, says M. Bertrand, sums up all morality in the formula: "being free, and remaining free"—for the first part states the psychological, and the second the moral consciousness, besides expressing very exactly the passage from science to morality. Common to both is the principle of non-contradiction, which alone can assume the perfect coherence of action and unity of thought and will with the logical accord of thought. To be sure, this very principle of non-contradiction must be taken on faith—the faith with which the moralist accepts those truths that sciences foreign to his own furnish him as working material. There follows the outline of a four-years course in sociology and morals—tentative, of course, and filled with historical and critical comments. The first year M. Bertrand would give to psychology; the second to logic (with especial regard to logical errors and fallacies); the third to æsthetics; and the fourth to political economy, institutional history, and social morality—in a word, as he says, to sociology.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Zur Einleitung in die Sociologie. FERDINAND TÖNNIES, Z. f. Ph., CXV, 2, pp. 240–251.

In this article the writer has particular reference to his work entitled *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.* The social unity, like any other unity, may be understood either as preceding the parts, which unity is called *Gemeinschaft*, or as constructed by thought out of a previous multiplicity, in which case it is called *Gesellschaft.* In the former case the unity finds expression primarily in affection, in the latter case in economic relations, in which individuals, more or less antagonistic to each other, nevertheless coöperate. In the theory put forth by the writer in the above mentioned book, it is attempted to maintain the individualistic conception within and in dependence upon the organic conception. The organic theory expresses the original and all-inclusive nature of social relations, provided that this theory be understood psychologically. The current theories follow too closely the analogy of biology and so do not adequately represent the facts. On the other hand, the scientific value of the theories which take their point of departure from the 'state of nature,' is that they oppose themselves to all supernatural explanations, and find the *ratio essendi* of the social structure in man's thinking and willing. Their defect is that they take a certain form of will, the will that distinguishes sharply between means and end, as the sole type of the human will, and so regard social relations simply as means to individual ends. There are, however, two forms of will. In the one case the will does not clearly distinguish between means and end; the end simply marks the stage of completion, while the means mark the stage of development regarding that which is willed; end and means are both willed spontaneously and include each other. This relation between means and end, which is best exemplified in artistic activity, represents *Gemeinschaft.* In the other case the ideas of end and means exclude each other, and it becomes necessary to unite them. End and means act upon each other with mechanical necessity; the means are willed only for the sake of the end. This relation between end and means is exemplified in barter. It represents *Gesellschaft,* and indicates that ideas have become more individual and abstract. The mechanical form thus arises out of and coexists with the organic form of society. There is no individualism except as it proceeds from and is conditioned by *Gemeinschaft,* or as it produces and maintains *Gesellschaft.*

BOYD BODE.

La sociologie biologique et le régime des castes. C. BOUGLÉ. Rev. Ph., XXV, 4. pp. 337–352.

The great question of the day for sociologists, says M. Bouglé, is whether society is or is not an organism. If it is, how great a light will biology throw upon sociology? To test the proposition let us apply the organic theory to some particular sociological problem, and see if it will enable us to reach a definite conclusion. Take, for instance, the question of the probable consequences of democracy: are they likely to be good or evil? Now, what are the laws biology has found true for animal organisms? First and foremost, that one may measure the perfection of the organism by the differentiation of its functions. But, as a corollary, it is added that the elements composing the varied organs in becoming thus organized, give up their individual freedom. Work is specialized, each cell does one thing and no more. Is this true of society? Is it not rather the case that in the highest society individuality most abounds? Biological laws half apply to sociological facts, but men are animals differing from others, not only in complexity of organization, but in the possession of consciousness. This is the decisive fact which explains why differentiation produces opposite effects in the social and in the organic world. Arguing from biological data, the inevitable conclusion would seem to be that a strict caste system was the ideal for society. All experience contradicts this, however, and makes it evident that society is more than a mere organism, to which biological laws apply. So that if one wishes to discover the normal effects of different social systems, aristocratic or democratic, they must not be compared with animal organisms but with each other. Sociology is not biology transposed, but an analytic history of different social forms.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Essai sur le mèchanique sociale. L'énergie sociale et ses mensurations. WINIARSSKI. Rev. Ph., XXV, 2, pp. 113–134.

The social aggregate is only a system of points in perpetual movement, approaching or receding from one another. The first cause of this movement is, by analogy with physical mechanics, the force of attraction

Certain gases combine more easily than others, and in the same way people attract or repel one another. While chemical phenomena are the manifestations of cosmic energy, psychical phenomena are manifestations of biological energy. Everything that exists manifests itself under one of the two forms, matter and energy. The law of the conservation of matter is: "Nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed." There are two forms of energy, active and potential. All of the theories of the animists and vitalists, who seek for a special foundation of life *independent of mechanical laws*, are vestiges of the dreams of the middle ages. All intellectual, economic, political, civil, religious, and æsthetic manifestations have their origin in the physiological foundations of life, hunger and love. As far as we know, these two impulses consist merely in the attraction of our bodies acting upon other bodies, animate or inanimate. Social energy can be reduced to biological energy. Just as all action of cosmic masses is accompanied by the production of heat, so all movement of biological social masses is transformed into psychical phenomena of different kinds. Here can be applied the first principle of thermo-dynamics, *i. e.*, equivalence. The application of this principle to social systems can only be made in a general way. Where there exists in society any differences in intensity of desires, this difference tends to be equalized in provoking struggle, competition, and work. The definitive end of this process of struggle is immobility. But there is the important factor of reversibility. The maximum of useful work is obtained when the resistance of the machine is equal to the prime mover in such a way that resistance can in its turn become prime mover. Applied to the social system, this explains a great mass of phenomena. Society in the past was based upon the separation of the classes, and cycles of transformation were therefore less reversible then than they are to-day. Whenever heat is manifested with mechanical effect, there must be a difference in temperature; whenever the social movement of work is executed, there must be a difference in the intensity of biological energy, the primitive source of which is hunger. The superior races represent the energy which puts the mechanism into activity. When all the force of the energy is exhausted, the mechanical action stops. True social progress can never stop; but it is well to know in an abstract way the mode of action and tendency of the different social forces.

MARGARET E. SCHALLENBERGER.

HISTORICAL.

Die Methode Spinozas. RAOUL RICHTER. Z. f. Ph., Bd. 113, pp. 12-37.

Spinoza's method is not merely ontological, it is a *conscious* ontology of quite a different sort from that of the Scholastics. We can not say that Spinoza unconsciously confuses 'thought' and 'being'; he consciously adopts and defends this identification. The ontological tendency of the system is shown in its results as well as in its presuppositions. An example of this is seen in the relation of the two concepts of 'adequate' and 'true' ideas, which are at first separated, but finally identified. The final ground for this identification is not epistemological, but metaphysical. In God, ideas follow with absolute necessity from one another, and in the same way bodies are conditioned. Now these two series correspond; therefore in God the 'adequate' ideas are also 'true' ideas. But as man has only true ideas in so far as God constitutes his essence, true and adequate ideas correspond in him also. Spinoza adopted from the Scholastics the identification of value with degrees of existence, supporting it, however, with acute reasoning. But when the identification of value with what possesses reality had once been made, and the latter equated with clear logical ideas (as opposed to error which is a negation), the proposition was already gained that all virtue and value consists in adequate knowledge. Spinoza strenuously opposes the method of proceeding by means of abstractions. But besides the universals which are abstract (*notiones universales*), he recognizes another kind of universals (*notiones communes*), which are in the highest degree real, clear, and true. Starting from the highest of these most real thoughts—that of the being which is the cause of all—we should arrange our thoughts in such a way that its essence may be the cause of all our ideas. Then our knowledge will to the highest degree correspond with nature. So we pass from one real entity to another, following the series of fixed and external things, but never passing to abstractions and universals. These fixed and eternal things, Spinoza tells us, though they are themselves particular, will, on account of their presence everywhere and their pervasive power, serve us as universals, and as the proximate causes of all things. The truth of these *notiones communes* is not proved by any logical process, but is apprehended immediately in *intuition* and feeling, rather than through demonstration. If the eternal and unchangeable being and its laws act as a universal, its existence can not be derived from its own concept, and if individual things and their laws are included in it, this must be a presupposition of the system, not the result of a logical deduction. This view is supported by Spinoza's doctrine of the various kinds of knowledge. For he refuses to regard logical or rational knowledge as the highest knowledge. The idea of the highest is no abstract notion, and the highest knowledge is not demonstrative. To intuition alone is the deepest essence of things, the immediate knowledge of God and his attributes, revealed. And Spinoza's doctrine that the criterion of truth is found in the immediate feeling of certainty agrees with this. The truth of the system does not rest on the logical validity of its conclusions, nor on the consistency of its fundamental notions, but its propositions gain their real cogency through the accompanying feeling of immediate conviction. Why, then, the show of logical demonstration? The answer lies in the concept of intuition. The complete intuition of all things in God demands complete freedom, and of this no man is completely capable. Only a gradual approach to this is possible. It is necessary, then, to adopt the second-best mode of procedure, and adopt the geometrical method as a make-shift (*Notbehelf*). With regard to the choice of the mathematical method, the author shows that the explanation of this—apart from its historical sources—lies in the nature of the presuppositions of Spinoza's system. In this connection he discusses the doctrine of parallelism, and the conception of time as a confused idea. Both of these are shown to be immediate consequences of Spinoza's fundamental premises, and rather methodological concepts of the system, than propositions gained through logical proofs.

J. E. C.

La substance d'après Leibniz. CLODIUS PIAT. Rev. Néo-Scol., VII, 1, pp. 33-57.

Leibniz, it is to be remembered, declares our author, was first a scholastic, and then a follower of Descartes, before he "became himself." Not till toward 1685 did he develop his own characteristic doctrines. Mechanism was to him but the ante-chamber of truth. The world was more than a machine. The machine was only what one saw; at its base was being—power, life, thought, and desire. The entire world, including in it its Creator, was a system of souls which differed from one another only in the intensity of their action. Corporeal aggregates were composed of monads —simple principles the essence of which was perception. Each of these had some representation of the infinite, from which it derived distinct ideas; and of the universe, from which it derived confused ideas. Only the ideas of God were entirely distinct. All was thought: the monads, so far as physical matters went, were wholly shut within themselves; but they exerted upon each other an ideal influence by means of the harmony pre-established between them by God. The human organism itself was only a system of representations: its reality was entirely phenomenal. Space and time, also, were ideas existing by and for thought—relations that the created beings sustained between themselves. To Leibniz the monads were the only realities; then came Kant, substituting for the infinite multiplicity of the monads the indefiniteness of matter; and lastly Fichte reduced matter itself to a form of consciousness.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

La première antinomie mathématique de Kant. CHARLES DUNAN. Rev. Ph., XXV, 4, pp. 353-377.

This article has been called forth by recent speculations which, rejecting Kant's solution of his first two 'mathematical' antinomies as inadequate, have returned again to the problem of the finite or infinite character of the universe. The author replies in detail to a number of these writers' objections, stating his own views in return. His conclusions are best summed up by his own closing words: "Thus for us as for Kant," he says, "the first mathematical antinomy is solved by the consideration that the phenomenal world does not exist in itself, but only by right of an intellectual representation. . . . For Kant, however, the phenomonal world is unreal as a creation of thought, and consequently as something which is distinguished from thought, so far as that is a creating act. For us, on the contrary, the phenomenal world . . . is the activity of thought itself, and as such it assumes the character of an existing thing, since being is action. Therefore, while Kant's solution is simple and negative, ours is double and positive. The world as a totality is neither finite nor infinite, not because it does not exist as a totality, but because, existing, it is at once phenomenal and noumenal. . . . But, as far as it is phenomenal, the world is finite, and as far as noumenal, if not exactly infinite, since it is not quantitative, it is something which, in the category of quantity, is translated by the idea of the infinite."

GEORGIA BENEDICT.